IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SUSAN McCLEMENT,

Plaintiff,

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Civil Action No. 1:13-CV-1450 (DEP)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

FOR PLAINTIFF

BUCKLEY, MENDLESON LAW OFFICE IRA MENDLESON, III, ESQ. 29 Wards Lane Albany, NY 12204

FOR DEFENDANT

HON. RICHARD S. HARTUNIAN
United States Attorney for the
Northern District of New York
P.O. Box 7198
100 S. Clinton Street
Syracuse, NY 13261-7198

DAVID E. PEEBLES U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE JASON P. PECK, ESQ. Special Assistant U.S. Attorney

ORDER

Currently pending before the court in this action, in which plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. Oral argument was conducted in connection with those motions on February 13, 2015 during a telephone conference, held on the record. At the close of argument I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the Commissioner's determination did not result from the application of proper legal principles and is not supported by substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and addressing the specific issues raised by the plaintiff in this appeal.

After due deliberation, and based upon the court's oral bench decision, a transcript of which is attached and incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby

This matter, which is before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), has been treated in accordance with the procedures set forth in General Order No. 18 (formerly, General Order No. 43) which was issued by the Hon. Ralph W. Smith, Jr., Chief United States Magistrate Judge, on January 28, 1998, and subsequently amended and reissued by Chief District Judge Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., on September 12, 2003. Under that General Order an action such as this is considered procedurally, once issue has been joined, as if cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings had been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

ORDERED, as follows:

1) Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.

2) The Commissioner's determination that plaintiff was not

disabled at the relevant times, and thus is not entitled to benefits under the

Social Security Act, is VACATED.

3) The matter is hereby REMANDED to the Commissioner, with a

directed finding of disability, for the purpose of calculating benefits owing to

the plaintiff.

4) The clerk is directed to enter judgment, based upon this

determination, remanding the matter to the Commissioner pursuant to

sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and closing this case.

Dated: February 13, 2015

Syracuse, New York

David E. Peebles

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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SUSAN McCLEMENT,

Plaintiff,

VS.

1:13-CV-1450

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

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Transcript of a Telephone Conference Decision held on February 13, 2015, at the James Hanley Federal Building, 100 South Clinton Street, Syracuse, New York, the HONORABLE DAVID E. PEEBLES, United States District Judge, Presiding.

APPEARANCES

(Via Telephone)

For Plaintiff:

BUCKLEY, MENDLESON LAW FIRM

Attorneys at Law 29 Wards Lane

Albany, New York 12204

BY: IRA MENDLESON, III, ESQ.

For Defendant:

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Office of Regional General Counsel

Region II

26 Federal Plaza - Room 3904 New York, New York 10278 BY: JASON P. PECK, ESQ.

Jodi L. Hibbard, RPR, CSR, CRR
Official United States Court Reporter
100 South Clinton Street
Syracuse, New York 13261-7367
(315) 234-8547

(The following is an excerpt from the proceedings held on 2/13/15.)

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(In Chambers, Counsel present via telephone.)

THE COURT: Very good. I appreciate excellent presentations by counsel.

I have before me a request for judicial review of a Commissioner's determination that the plaintiff in this action was not disabled at the relevant times and therefore ineligible for the benefits for which she applied. Review is sought under 42 United States Code Section 405(g).

As everyone knows, under that provision, the court's task is fairly limited and it applies a very deferential standard. My role is to determine whether proper legal principles were applied and the ALJ and Commissioner's determination were supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

The background for the case is as follows: The plaintiff was born in January of 1975 and is 40 years old. She's a high school graduate with some trade school training. She's right-hand dominant, she's divorced, last worked in July of 2009, where she was injured in a submarine shop setting. She's also worked as a certified nurse aide in a nursing home, as a cashier in a grocery and drugstore, and as

a bank teller.

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In July of 2009, she consulted with an orthopedist, Dr. Todd Shatynski, who saw her from then until roughly January of 2010. She has also treated with Latham Medical Group including Drs. Locke and Yoon who appear to be general practitioners.

In February of 2010, she saw Dr. Daniel T. Phelan, an orthopedic surgeon, who performed a SLAP repair of the plaintiff's left extremity on July 28, 2010. After the surgery the plaintiff continued to complain of pain in her left shoulder. She went to physical therapy between September and November of 2010. She was ultimately seen by Dr. Kyle Flik for a second opinion on May 25, 2011. Dr. Flik diagnosed her with suspected bicipital tendinitis and gave her a Lidocaine injection. Didn't appear to question plaintiff's complaints of pain. His reports include page 259 of the administrative transcript. He indicated he doubted the plaintiff would ever improve.

She has seen several Workers' Compensation consultants, including Dr. Steven Hausmann, in 2010 diagnosed plaintiff with adhesive capsulitis, indicated she had a limited range of motion and no ability to lift with her left extremity.

She was also consultatively seen by Dr. Louis
Benton in the Workers' Compensation setting on November 14th,

2011, and again, September 8, 2012.

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She was seen on behalf of the Commissioner, as plaintiff's counsel indicated, by Dr. Jose Corvalan on January 19, 2012. He issued a medical source evaluation and that is in the record.

She was seen on September 24, 2012 by Dr. Andrew Dubin on referral from Dr. Phelan. He indicated that plaintiff had a marked partial disability.

Plaintiff underwent a second surgery on April 24, 2012.

Procedurally, plaintiff applied for Disability
Insurance benefits on November 1, 2010, alleging an onset
date of July 2, 2009. Hearings were conducted on May 8, 2012
and December 15, 2011 by Administrative Law Judge Carl
Stephan.

On May 18, 2012, ALJ Stephan issued a decision.

The decision became a final determination of the Commissioner on October 1, 2013 when the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied plaintiff's application for review of that determination.

In his decision, the administrative law judge went through the now familiar five-step test for determining disability, found that the plaintiff was insured through December 31, 2014, at step one concluded she had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 2, 2009, noted

that she suffers from severe -- at step two, severe conditions posing work-related limitations including left shoulder pain post-arthroscopic surgery and asthma. At step three he concluded, however, that she did not -- her conditions did not meet or equal medically any of the listed presumptively disabling conditions. He considered both the musculoskeletal issues and her respiratory issues under Listings 1.00 and 3.00.

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He next determined, after surveying the medical evidence, that she retains the residual functional capacity to work in a sedentary setting, except that she's limited to lifting and/or carrying 5 pounds occasionally and occasionally reaching in all directions with her nondominant left upper extremity but she has no restrictions with her dominant right upper extremity. In addition, she has no ability — no sit, stand, or walk limitations but cannot perform any climbing of ladders or scaffolds and no crawling. He further found she should not be exposed to concentrated amounts of respiratory irritants.

Applying that RFC, he next presented or -presented a hypothetical, two hypothetical questions, one of
which tracked his RFC finding, to a vocational expert, who
concluded and testified that plaintiff cannot perform her
past relevant work, and that she is unable to perform in
other capacities -- that she is able to perform, I'm sorry,

work available in the national and regional economies.

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The second hypothetical which was far more restricted, as plaintiff's counsel indicated, resulted in a finding that plaintiff was not disabled. The ALJ also noted that if the grids were applied, a finding of no disability would be compelled by Rule 202.21, but he determined that with her nonexertional limitations, a vocational expert should be — should testify based on the possibility of erosion of the job base on which the grids are predicated.

When I look at the medical evidence, I have to conclude that the finding that plaintiff can occasionally lift with her left extremity is not supported by substantial evidence. It is certainly contradicted by plaintiff's testimony. At pages 38 and 50, she testified she is unable to use her left arm. Dr. Hausmann indicated that she is unable to lift above her waist with her left arm at 223 of the administrative transcript. Dr. Benton said that she is able to work but cannot use her left extremity, left upper extremity for any meaningful work, that is at 276. I note that the administrative law judge claimed to have given great weight to the opinions of Dr. Benton. Dr. Corvalan also indicated that plaintiff has a marked limitation in her use of her left upper extremity, that is at 280. administrative law judge claims to have given at least some weight to Dr. Corvalan's opinions.

When the ALJ balanced the medical evidence, he focused on Dr. Locke and Dr. Yoon, these are generalists who were treating the plaintiff primarily prior to her even first surgery; Dr. Shatynski, who treated the plaintiff early on; and Dr. Flik, who saw her only once and even then found no reason to question her pain and gave her a Lidocaine injection.

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Her treating source unfortunately has really not provided a medical source statement. Dr. Phelan did, however, say that she was 100 percent disabled, and while it is certainly the law that his, his raw conclusion of disability is not acceptable and entitled to controlling weight since it addresses a matter reserved to the Commissioner, nonetheless, it certainly is an indication that Dr. Phelan concurs with these other opinions about her limitations.

So I conclude that the vocational expert's testimony based on residual function — the first hypothetical that tracks the residual functional capacity is flawed because the residual functional capacity is not supported by substantial evidence. And were it not for the second hypothetical, I would remand the matter with a direction that the matter be reconsidered. However, I agree with the plaintiff that the second hypothetical does track the medical evidence and is supported and because the

1	vocational expert testified that given the limitations of the
2	second hypothetical, plaintiff is unable to work in any
3	capacity in any job available in the national and local
4	economy, I conclude that there is persuasive proof of
5	disability and I will therefore vacate the Commissioner's
6	determination and remand with a directed finding of
7	disability solely for purposes of calculating benefits.
8	I thank you both for your excellent presentations
9	again and I hope you have a great weekend.
10	MR. MENDLESON: Okay, thank you, your Honor.
11	THE COURT: Thank you.
12	(Proceedings Concluded, 10:28 a.m.)
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1	CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER
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4	I, JODI L. HIBBARD, RPR, CRR, CSR, Federal
5	Official Realtime Court Reporter, in and for the
6	United States District Court for the Northern
7	District of New York, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that
8	pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States
9	Code, that the foregoing is a true and correct
10	transcript of the stenographically reported
11	proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and
12	that the transcript page format is in conformance
13	with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of
14	the United States.
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16	Dated this 13th day of February, 2015.
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19	/S/ JODI L. HIBBARD
20	JODI L. HIBBARD, RPR, CRR, CSR Official U.S. Court Reporter
21	official o.o. coard Reporter
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